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Abstract
Congress has discussed several reform proposals [for the Social Security system], but has failed to agree on a
solution that maintains the redistributive structure of the current system while also providing economic
advantages. This paper consists of several additional sections that logically demonstrate why a fully funded
system with the buildup of a large permanent trust fund is the most advantageous Social Security reform
proposal.
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The Benefits of a Fully Funded Social
Security System
 By Nathan Taulbee
I. INTRODUCTION
The Social Security system, formally
known as Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
Disability Insurance (OASDI), began in 1935
under the direction of former President Franklin
Roosevelt.  The original purpose of the system
was to ensure that the nation’s elderly could earn
a decent income in the later years of their life.  At
that time, the elderly experienced horrific
financial turmoil as numerous banks failed due
to the Great Depression and the stock market
crash of 1929.  The implementation of the Social
Security system pleased many Americans in the
1930’s, and has continued to persevere
throughout the latter portion of the twentieth
century.  However, recent data indicate that
funding for the system will be exhausted in 2029
(Sass, 1997).  Congress has discussed several
reform proposals, but has failed to agree on a
solution that maintains the redistributive structure
of the current system while also providing
economic advantages.  This paper consists of
several additional sections that logically
demonstrate why a fully funded system with the
buildup of a large permanent trust fund is the most
advantageous Social Security reform proposal.
In Section II, the specific reasons why the system
is financially unsound today will be discussed.
Section III will examine research on the major
reform proposals.  Section IV will explain what
a fully funded system is.  Sections V and VII will
explain how a fully funded system can be
achieved.  Section VI will examine the advantages
and disadvantages of a fully funded system in
comparison to other reform proposals.  Empirical
analysis will assist in supporting this claim.
Finally, the last section will offer some concluding
thoughts on the macroeconomic effects of
reforming the Social Security system.
II. WHY THE SYSTEM IS FINANCIALLY
UNSOUND TODAY
The original intent of the Social Security
system was that a fully funded system financed by
the payroll tax would be used as a government
transfer program to assist the elderly poor.  Since
that time, however, several changes have been made.
For example, in 1939 the U.S. government replaced
the fully funded system with a pay-as-you-go system
in order to meet the needs of current retirees.  Under
a pay-as-you-go system, payroll tax revenues from
current workers are used for the payments to current
recipients.  The problem with the pay-as-you-go
system is that the projected support-benefit ratio will
not be adequate to continue Social Security far into
the 21st century.  According to the Cato Institute,
only 2 workers will support a beneficiary in 2025,
as opposed to the 16 workers that supported each
beneficiary in 1950 (Shipman, 1995). The primary
cause of this is that the abundant Baby Boom
generation will soon reach retirement, causing a
dramatic increase in the needed revenues to pay for
retirees.  In addition, the birthrate has declined
tremendously since the mid-1900’s from at least 2.5
children per woman to less than 2 children per
woman.  According to the Social Security
Administration, this trend is expected to continue
into the 21st century (Beach, 1998).  Finally,
Americans are living much longer due to medical
advances, causing the support-benefit ratio to decline
even more.  Table 1 illustrates the rising trend of
additional years lived beyond retirement. (Beach,
1998)
With the decline in the support-benefit ratio,
payroll tax revenues will eventually no longer meet
the benefit outlays.   When this occurs, the
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government will then use money from the Social
Security Trust Fund to pay for the deficit.  In essence,
the trust fund serves as a safety net in times of Social
Security deficits.  Beginning in 2012, revenues from
current workers will not cover the payments to
current retirees, which means that the government
must delve into the trust fund.
According to data from the
Social Security Administration,
the current trust fund will be
exhausted in 2029, as deficits
are projected to continue well
after 2012 (Sass, 1997).  As a
result of this, many workers that
paid into the system would not
receive the benefits they
expected in retirement.  In order
to continue a successful Social
Security program that maintains a redistribution
element, reform is needed today.
III. A REVIEW OF MAJOR REFORM
PROPOSALS
Three major reform proposals that currently
exist today are the Maintain Benefits proposal, the
Individual Accounts proposal, and the Personal
Savings Accounts proposal.  Much research
currently exists on these proposals with clear
ideological beliefs impacting the findings.  For
example, research from the Brookings Institution,
a rather liberal organization, supports the Maintain
Benefits proposal while research from the Cato
Institute, a libertarian organization, favors the
privatization proposals.
The chief characteristics of the Maintain
Benefits proposal is that the current defined benefit
structure of Social Security will be maintained with
slight alterations being made to the size of the trust
fund.  Under a defined benefit Social Security
system, a benefit formula based on an individual’s
average career earnings along with his or her age
determines the amount received in retirement.  The
intent of this benefit formula is to redistribute income
to those with lower average career earnings.  The
redistributive component of the current system is
the primary reason why members of the Brookings
Institution favor the Maintain Benefits proposal.
The main proposal for altering the current
system while maintaining its defined-benefit
structure is the one that implements a fully funded
system with the buildup of a large trust fund.  This
reform proposal offers great economic advantages
that the privatization proposals do not offer.  A
greater examination of this
proposal along with its
advantage will be discussed in
the next three sections.
Meanwhile, the two major
privatization proposals, the
Individual Accounts proposal
and the Personal Savings
Accounts proposal, are based on
a defined contribution element in
addition to the defined benefit
element.  That is, retirees receive
a general amount of funding determined by the
current benefit formula along with a specific amount
of funding that is determined by the success of that
retiree’s contribution account.  For example, under
the Individual Accounts proposal, a new 1.6 percent
employee payroll tax would be used as a source of
revenue for each individual’s own account.  The
current 12.4% payroll tax that is split between
employers and employees would not change under
this proposal (Beach, 1998).
Under the Personal Savings Accounts
proposal, 5 percent out of the total 12.4% payroll
tax would go toward a privately managed personal
account.  The remaining 7.4 percent of the payroll
tax would be used as a “flat retirement” benefit for
recipients.  The primary difference between the
Personal Savings Account proposal and the
Individual Accounts proposal is that individuals
manage the investment of funds in the former
account while the government manages funds in the
latter account (Beach, 1998).
Because the Individual Accounts proposal
and the Personal Savings Accounts proposal both
favor a defined contribution component to Social
Security, less revenue would be available for
redistribution to the elderly poor.  The Cato Institute
favors these privatization proposals primarily
because of the individual choice that they would
offer (Shipman, 1995).  Though many people favor
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privatization and believe it is the answer to the
current Social Security crisis, having a fully funded
system with a large trust fund is the most
advantageous proposal.  The remainder of the paper
will examine the characteristics and advantages of
a fully funded system along with the disadvantages
of a privatized system.
IV. WHAT EXACTLY IS A FULLY FUNDED
SYSTEM?
As stated previously, the Social Security
system currently operates under a partially funded
system.  That is, payroll tax revenues from current
workers are used for current retirees.  And in years
of a Social Security deficit, the trust fund will be
used as the additional source of revenue needed to
pay benefits to retirees.  Under a fully funded system,
all benefits paid out to recipients come directly from
the revenue in the trust fund.  When a large enough
trust fund is achieved, current workers will no longer
have to support current retirees.  But what exactly
determines whether the trust fund is large enough
to be deemed “permanent?”  According to the Board
of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds,
“The long-range [permanent] estimates include the
cost of ending the seventy-five year projection period
with a trust fund equal to 100% of the following
year’s expenditures.” (Diamond, 1997)  In addition,
the Board of Trustees made the following
conclusions about a large permanent trust fund:
“If the estimated trust fund ratio for a fund
is at least 100 percent at the beginning of the
projection period, then it must be projected to
remain at or above 100 percent throughout the
10-year projection period.  Alternatively, if the
ratio is initially less than 100 percent, then it must
be projected to reach a level of at least 100 percent
by the beginning of the sixth year and to remain
at or above 100 percent throughout the remainder
of the 10-year period.  Failure to meet this test …
is an indication that solvency of the program over
the next 10 years is in question and that
Congressional action is needed to improve the
short-range financial adequacy of the program.”
(Diamond, 1997)
It may not seem like much of a problem to
achieve this defined permanent trust.  However,
moving from the current partially funded system to
a fully funded system requires in-depth analysis.
V. HOW TO ACHIEVE A FULLY FUNDED
SYSTEM
In order to obtain a fully funded system,
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Congress first must eliminate the projected 2012
Social Security deficit (Beach, 1995).  Figure 1, a
graph from the 1995 Bipartisan Commission on
Entitlement and Tax Reform, illustrates the rise in
Social Security outflows relative to inflows over a
37-year period, with the breakeven point occurring
at the projected 2012 date (Shipman, 1995).
To eliminate the projected 2012 deficit,
several modifications must be made to the current
system.  One such modification requires increasing
the working period over which a retiree’s benefits
are computed.  It is estimated that the projected
Social Security deficit will be reduced by 12% if
benefits are computed over a period of 38 years
rather than 35 years.  This is because each recipient’s
payment will be lower due to the three additional
lower income years (Overview, 1998).
In addition to adding lower-wage years to
the benefit computation, the Social Security deficit
can also be reduced if government workers are added
to the system.  Expanding coverage to the 3.7 million
state and local government employees would reduce
the projected Social Security deficit by 10%
(Overview, 1998).
A third modification that would reduce the
Social Security deficit is an acceleration of the future
retirement age to 67.  Currently, those individuals
age 65 and older are considered retirees (though
early and late retirement is possible).  The Social
Security Act of 1983 called for an increase in the
retirement age to 67 by 2022.  By increasing the
retirement age to 67 in 2011 rather than 2022, 22%
of the projected Social Security budget deficit can
be reduced (Overview, 1998).
A fourth way of reducing the projected
deficit is by reducing the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) by .21 percent each year.  Many economists
believe that the CPI can be reduced even further
because it currently overstates inflation
tremendously.  The effect of a .21 percent adjustment
to the CPI would reduce the projected Social
Security deficit by 14% (Overview, 1998).
A final way of reducing the 2012 Social
Security deficit is through taxation of any additional
benefits a retiree receives beyond what he or she
contributed.  Implementing this policy would reduce
the deficit by 14% also (Overview, 1998).  These
five measures put together would reduce the
projected Social Security deficit by an estimated
72%.
Once the projected Social Security deficit
is eliminated, Congress must find a way to add to
the current trust fund in order to build up a large
permanent trust fund.  One such way to accomplish
this is through a payroll tax increase.  According to
actuarial data from the Social Security
Administration, a permanent 2.23 percent increase
in the payroll tax would restore financial balance
over the next 75 years (Diamond, 1997).  However,
this raises questions of equity, since the payroll tax
is a flat rate as opposed to a progressive rate. Perhaps
a more equitable solution is to build up the trust
fund with increased income taxation.  By taxing
income over payroll, higher income individuals will
pay more into the large trust fund.  Implementing a
progressive structure into the buildup of the large
trust fund is necessary to maintain the redistributive
component of Social Security.
Finally, with the recent budget surpluses and
the predicted future surpluses, Congress should
consider allocating portions of these surpluses to the
Social Security Trust Fund.  By doing this, the
government can build up the trust fund without
raising income tax rates as much.  In conclusion, by
implementing any combination of these
modifications to the current Social Security system,
Congress can make steps toward eliminating the
projected 2012 Social Security deficit and building
a permanent trust fund.
VI.  THE ADVANTAGES OF A FULLY
FUNDED SYSTEM
A fully funded Social Security system would
be very beneficial for several reasons.  One reason
is that when full funds are obtained, the system will
have fewer worries over future near-term projected
deficits.  The government would then be able to
concentrate on more demanding issues.
A similar advantage of a fully funded system
is that it maintains much of the structure of the
current system.  Many Americans will likely be
pleased to maintain the current system that has
proven to be popular in its years of existence.
Because of this, members of Congress will be able
Taulbee
The Park Place Economist / vol. VII80
to focus on other, more pressing issues on Capital
Hill in Washington, D.C.
In addition to political reasons, a fully
funded system would also give the government more
opportunities to invest a portion of the funds in
equities.  Numerous studies indicate that investing
a portion of the trust fund into equities would
increase the rate of return tremendously.  For
example, according to the Advisory Council of
Social Security, if the U.S. began to build a
permanent trust fund with government securities in
1997, that trust fund would hold approximately $1
trillion.  If 40% of the trust fund in 1997 were
invested in equities, that
same trust fund would
hold $60 trillion
(Diamond, 1997).
Though investing a
portion of the trust fund
into equities provides a
much greater return, it
is important to note that
a much greater amount
of risk is involved.  In
addition, the
government would
have partial ownership
of many American
companies, which has
many political drawbacks.  Although some
disadvantages do exist with private investment of
the Social Security Trust Fund, the main advantage
of having a large trust fund as opposed to the current
trust fund in regard to equity investments is that the
government has more room for error.
The chief economic advantage of preserving
Social Security with a fully funded system is that
national saving (public saving minus private saving)
will increase, thus inducing future growth in the
economy.  According to Steven Sass and Robert
Triest, two participants in the 41st annual economic
conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
in June, 1997, increasing funding of Social Security
will “restore Social Security’s fiscal solvency” and
“increase national saving and future living
standards.” (Sass, 1997)  The Solow growth model,
a macroeconomic model that links savings to
economic growth, is the necessary tool to
demonstrate how building up the trust fund will
increase future living standards.  According to
Figure 2, as savings increases, sf(k)1, the current
saving rate in the economy, shifts to sf(k)2, the new
saving rate in the economy, and a new equilibrium
amount of capital per worker (k2) in achieved.  And
according to Macroeconomic theory, as the original
capital per worker level k1 rises to k2, additional
gross domestic product (GDP) can be produced,
resulting in economic growth.  One important
outcome of the 41st annual economic conference of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston is that
privatization does not
have the same impact
on national saving that
the buildup of a large
permanent trust fund
would have.  According
to Triest, “Privatization
of Social Security
might be a politically
feasible means of
achieving increased
pre-funding, but by
itself would not
necessarily increase
[national] saving.”
(Sass, 1997)
Another advantage of a fully funded system
that privatization proposals do not have is its
redistributive makeup.  Since Social Security was
established as a transfer program to assist the poor
elderly, a fully funded system does not change the
redistributive structure of the current system.
Although the size of the Social Security funds may
change with a permanent trust fund, nothing is done
to the allocation of these funds.  Thus the defined
benefit structure of the current system is maintained.
On the contrary, various privatization proposals
eliminate part or all of the defined benefit structure
in favor of a defined contribution structure, making
Social Security less redistributive.  The reason for
this is that a certain percentage of individual’s
payroll tax revenues would be placed in a private
account that could only be utilized by that
individual.  The primary problem with this is that
The Benefits of a Fully Funded Social Security System
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Figure 2: The Effect of Increased Social Secu-
rity on Capital Stock per Worker
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less money is available for redistribution, making
Social Security more of a complete pension program
rather than a transfer program.  It is essential to
remember that Social Security is a government
transfer program aimed at helping the elderly poor.
VII. THE DISADVANTAGES OF A FULLY
FUNDED SYSTEM
Though a fully funded system has many
advantages, some drawbacks are present.  For
example, increasing saving to build up the larger
trust for higher future consumption results in less
consumption today.  Figure 3 demonstrates how
GDP will fall in the short
run due to a downward
shift in the aggregate
demand curve (AD1 to
AD2) because of the
decreased consumption
levels of both retirees
and employees.  As
aggregate demand
drops, the equilibrium
amount of output falls
from Point A to Point B.
In the long run, the
economy will move to
Point C, the full
employment level of
output (located on the long-run aggregate supply
curve).             Although the decline in output today
(the move from Point A to Point B) results in
economic hardship for Americans, this hardship can
be justified by the fact that the nation’s pool of saving
and capital stock would be reduced in the future
anyway [if no changes were made to the current
system] because of the necessary sale of trust fund
assets expected in 2019 (Sass, 8).  Thus the question
becomes one of sacrificing now for the continuation
of social security in the 21st century versus
sacrificing at a future time that results in no
continuation of social security.
A second drawback of moving toward a
fully funded system is that one generation must pay
for itself and for the current retirees.  While the
permanent trust fund will be sufficient for future
retirees, current retirees must somehow continue to
receive payments during the transition period.
Perhaps the most equitable solution to this transition
period problem is to spread the burden over
everyone.  This can be accomplished by reducing
benefits of current retirees while raising the payroll
tax rate beyond what is needed to help build up the
permanent trust fund.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Reforming Social Security is not an easy
task.  Although moving toward a defined-benefit
fully funded system with a permanent trust has many
advantages, critics still claim that it is not the right
solution.  Some
opponents argue that
the transition costs to a
fully funded system
would require some
generations to “pay
twice.”  However, any
reform proposal would
result in one
generation paying
more than “its fair
share.”  According to
data found by The
Century Foundation,
in addition to requiring
the current generation
of workers to “pay twice,” privatization of Social
Security would also require about $6.5 trillion in
additional taxes over the next 72 years.  Other
opponents claim that selecting a permanent trust
fund over privatization lowers the rate of return for
retirees. Though this may be true if a portion of the
large trust fund is not invested in equities, how can
anyone be sure that the stock market will remain a
safe investment source in the future?  When
factoring in the additional taxation of privatization,
the insecurity of private individual accounts, and
the fact that nearly every reform proposal requires
one generation to pay more than its fair share,
proponents of privatization are left with little to
argue.  Meanwhile, advocates of a fully funded
system with a permanent trust fund can claim that
increased national saving will spur future economic
growth and that, most importantly, the
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progressiveness of the current system can be
maintained.
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